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SAMANTAR V. YOUSUF: A FALSE SUMMIT IN 
AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS CIVIL 
LITIGATION 
Timothy E. Donahue* 
Abstract: The quest to bring human rights abusers to justice is a chal-
lenge wrought with legal obstacles. One such obstacle is the common law 
principle of sovereign immunity, under which a foreign nation cannot be 
sued in a court outside of its own jurisdiction. In 1976, Congress sought 
to eliminate inconsistent application of such immunity by passing the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The inconsistency remained, 
however, as some circuit courts interpreted the FSIA immunity as apply-
ing to both foreign government officials, as well as foreign states. The 
U.S. Supreme Court settled the issue in 2010 in Samantar v. Yousuf, a civil 
suit against a former Somali general charged with torture, when it held 
that FSIA immunity does not apply to foreign officials sued in their indi-
vidual capacity. While some lauded the decision as a landmark in human 
rights litigation, such optimism appears misplaced. Because of the various 
avenues of common law immunity still available to foreign officials, the 
possibility that the precedent of Samantar will prove to be a valuable tool 
in bringing justice to abuse victims remains highly remote. 
Introduction 
 On June 1, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision praised 
by human rights groups worldwide.1 In Samantar v. Yousuf, the Court 
held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) did not apply to 
individual foreign officials but only to foreign states.2 The doctrine of 
sovereign immunity is a long-held common law principle that waives 
U.S. jurisdiction over the activities of foreign states, “extending virtually 
absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns as ‘a matter of grace and com-
ity.’”3 In 1976 Congress passed the FSIA with the intent of codifying the 
                                                                                                                      
* Timothy E. Donahue is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 See US Supreme Court Allows Suit to Proceed Against Former Somali Minister of Defense, Human 
Rights Watch ( June 1, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/06/01/us-supreme-court- 
allows-suit-proceed-against-former-somali-minister-defense. 
2 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 (2010). 
3 Id. at 2284. (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 
(1983)). 
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complicated application of common law sovereign immunity.4 Before 
Samantar, federal courts were split over the extent of immunity offered 
under the FSIA, most notably whether the Act covered the actions of 
foreign officials acting within their official capacity.5 By stripping for-
eign officials of FSIA immunity, it appeared that the Supreme Court 
had taken a major step towards ensuring that legal recourse would be 
available to those harmed by foreign government officials.6 Human 
rights advocates worldwide lauded the decision as a landmark opportu-
nity to bring justice to those who had suffered torture, persecution and 
other abuses at the hands of foreign officers.7 
 Although Samantar clarified the various district courts’ interpreta-
tions of the FSIA, given the various other means of immunity still avail-
able to foreign officials the decision will likely have less of an impact 
than some have anticipated.8 There are two obstacles that will prevent 
Samantar from significantly influencing suits against foreign officials.9 
First, the district courts will likely find that the common law extends 
immunity to foreign officials for acts performed within their official 
capacity.10 Second, because the State Department has the power to 
make immunity determinations when the FSIA does not apply, only 
individuals of no strategic importance will be found liable under the 
Samantar ruling.11 
 Part I of this Comment examines the factual and procedural back-
ground of the Samantar case. Part II discusses the legal framework of 
sovereign immunity and the Supreme Court’s opinion. Finally, Part III 
examines the potential impact of Samantar on sovereign immunity and 
human rights abuse litigation in America, paying particular attention to 
the remaining avenues of immunity available to government officials. 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006); Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2285. 
5 Compare Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that FSIA immunity extends to foreign officials acting within their official capac-
ity), with Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907, 915 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that FSIA 
immunity does not extend to heads of state). 
6 See US Supreme Court Allows Suit to Proceed Against Former Somali Minister of Defense, supra 
note 1. 
7 See, e.g., id. 
8 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292 (emphasizing the narrowness of the holding). 
9 See id. at 2290–91 (holding both that immunity of the foreign state can extend to of-
ficial capacity actions and that Congress did not intend to eliminate State Department 
immunity determinations under the FSIA). 
10 See Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1103. 
11 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291 n.19; see also John Bellinger, Ruling Burdens State De-
partment, Nat’l L.J., June 28, 2010, at 47 (stating that the Department of Defense will be 
reluctant to expose foreign defense ministers to liability). 
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I. Background 
 In October 1969, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre and the 
Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) assumed power in Somalia fol-
lowing a socialist coup.12 Following the rise of Barre’s dictatorship, Mo-
hamed Ali Samantar served as Somalia’s First Vice President and Minis-
ter of Defense from 1980–1986, and then as Prime Minister from 1987–
1990.13 During the 1970s and early 1980s, the SRC government began 
to discriminate and marginalize members of the Issaq clan, restricting 
their access to land, jobs and business opportunities.14 In response, the 
Issaq launched a campaign of violent government resistance known as 
the Somali Nationalist Movement (SNM).15 Clashes between the Barre 
regime and the SNM resulted in the Somali military, under Samantar’s 
leadership, targeting Issaq civilians and subjecting them to various hu-
man rights abuses—including the massacre of tens of thousands of Is-
saq clan members, many of who were civilians.16 The Barre regime col-
lapsed in 1991 after the withdrawal of U.S. and international support, 
and Samantar eventually settled into civilian life in Virginia.17 
 The plaintiffs originally brought suit in November 2004 in the 
Eastern District of Virginia under the Torture Victim Protection Act 
and Alien Tort Statute.18 In this civil action, they alleged that while serv-
ing as the Somali Minister of Defense, Samantar had commanded and 
controlled military forces that tortured, killed, or arbitrarily detained 
them or their family members.19 After a lengthy inquiry, the district 
court dismissed the suit in 2007 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
accepting the defense that the FSIA applied to Samantar for “acts he 
undertook on behalf of the Somali government.”20 The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision in 2009, holding 
that the FSIA did not apply to individuals—even those who had acted 
in an official capacity—and rejected the majority view among the dis-
                                                                                                                      
12 See Background Note: Somalia, U.S. State Department (May 14, 2010), http://www. 
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm. 
13 See Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 
2007), rev’d, 532 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2009). 
14 See Richard H. Shultz, Jr., State Disintegration and Ethnic Conflict: A Framework for Analy-
sis, 541 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 75, 85 (1995). 
15 See id. 
16 See Marc Michelson, Somalia: The Painful Road to Reconciliation, 40 Africa Today 53, 
55 (1993). 
17 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2283 (2010). 
18 See id. at 2282–83. 
19 See id. at 2282. 
20 Samantar, 2007 WL 2220579 at *15. 
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trict courts that those individuals were immune from such lawsuits.21 
After remanding the case to the district court to determine whether 
common law immunity might be available to Samantar, the U.S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to address whether the FSIA provided 
immunity to individuals acting within their official capacity.22 In a six-
justice opinion, with a unanimous concurrence in the judgment, the 
Supreme Court held that under both the language and intent of the 
FSIA, immunity protections only extended to states themselves and did 
not extend to government officials.23 
II. Discussion 
 Prior to 1976, the U.S. law governing sovereign immunity was a 
complicated patchwork of common law, executive branch authority, 
and realpolitik.24 In Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, the Supreme Court 
held that no statutory or common law granted U.S. jurisdiction over 
foreign sovereigns absent their express consent. 25 The scope of immu-
nity established by Schooner Exchange eventually extended near-absolute 
immunity to friendly sovereigns upon recommendation by the State 
Department.26 In the absence of such a recommendation, the district 
courts have the authority to decide whether sovereign immunity should 
apply.27 The stated purpose of the FSIA was to codify a more restrictive 
policy of sovereign immunity and to transfer determinations of immu-
nity from the State Department to the courts.28 
 The FSIA explicitly states that “a foreign state shall be immune 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.”29 Because the 
FSIA still operates under Schooner Exchange’s broad application of sover-
eign immunity, rather than codifying where immunity exists, it instead 
codifies the specific exceptions and waivers to sovereign immunity.30 
These exceptions embody the “restrictive” theory of immunity, granting 
                                                                                                                      
21 See Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 378, 381 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2278 
(2009). 
22 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283–84. 
23 See id. at 2282, 2286. 
24 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486–87 (1983). 
25 See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 116, 125 (1812). 
26 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284 (2010). 
27 See id. 
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006) (declaring the purpose of the FSIA to be the placement 
of immunity determinations within the federal courts, with no sovereign immunity granted 
for commercial activity of foreign states). 
29 See id. § 1604. 
30 See id. § 1605. 
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jurisdiction over suits against foreign states that involve solely commer-
cial activity, property loss, or tort claims that occurred in the United 
States.31 
 In 2008, Congress expanded the FSIA beyond such commercial 
concerns by including a terrorism exception to sovereign immunity.32 
Under this provision, foreign states designated as state sponsors of ter-
rorism are subject to liability for “torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft 
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support . . . if 
such an act is engaged in by an official employee, or agent of such a 
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office.”33 
 Even though the FSIA remains largely silent on offering immunity 
to individual officials of a foreign state, many district courts extended 
FSIA immunity to foreign officials who had been sued in their individ-
ual capacities.34 In Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals ruled that the FSIA provided immunity to a Phil-
ippine anti-corruption agent who was sued by a California resident for 
stopping payment on a potentially corrupt letter of credit.35 The Ninth 
Circuit held that failure to apply immunity to government officials act-
ing in their official capacity would simply allow “litigants to accomplish 
indirectly what the act barred them from doing directly.”36 
 Nevertheless, not all courts were satisfied with the reasoning put 
forth in Chuidian.37 In Enahoro v. Abubakar, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld a district court’s refusal to extend blanket FSIA immu-
nity to foreign government officials pursuant to Chuidian.38 The suit 
was factually similar to Samantar, and the court found that FSIA immu-
nity was not available to the former military leader of Nigeria against 
allegations of wrongful death, torture, and abuse.39 Contrary to 
Chuidian, the court held that the FSIA only applied to suits against for-
eign states themselves and did not grant immunity to former heads of 
                                                                                                                      
31 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2285. 
32 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008). 
33 Id. 
34 See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990). 
35 See id. at 1106. 
36 Id. at 1102. 
37 See, e.g., Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005). 
38 See id. 
39 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2282; Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 879. 
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state.40 It was these divergent interpretations and applications of sover-
eign immunity that the Supreme Court hoped to clarify in Samantar.41 
 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Samantar was the unex-
pected alignment of parties that provided amicus briefs to the Court.42 
The U.S. government’s brief encouraged the Court to rule that FSIA 
immunity does not apply to individuals and argued that any determina-
tions of a foreign official’s immunity remained the province of the Ex-
ecutive Branch.43 Similarly, a coalition of Holocaust survivors and non-
profits dedicated to ending the crisis in Darfur also supported the plain-
tiffs’ interpretation of the FSIA as excluding individual immunity.44 
These groups argued that the Supreme Court’s decision must be consis-
tent with the international legal principles established by the Nurem-
berg trials, which ensured that human rights violators could not “escape 
liability by hiding behind a cloak of sovereign immunity.”45 Ironically, 
there was also considerable support for Samantar’s claim for immunity 
from both the American Jewish Congress and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.46 Both parties supported Samantar’s contention that the immu-
nity of foreign officials must be preserved under the FSIA as a matter of 
established international law.47 Because Israel and Saudi Arabia both 
face constant accusations of human rights abuses and war crimes, they 
likely felt that any other interpretation could expose visiting govern-
ment officials to civil liability for such alleged acts in U.S. Courts.48 
 Justice Stevens’ opinion, with which six other justices joined, pro-
vided a thorough examination of both the text of the FSIA as well as 
                                                                                                                      
40 See Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 881 (disagreeing with the interpretation of the FSIA in Chui-
dian). 
41 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2285. 
42 Jacob Victor, Why Are Jewish Groups Backing a Somali War Criminal?, Jewish Week (Mar. 
18, 2010), http://www.thejewishweek.com/editorial_opinion/opinion/why_are_jewish_groups_ 
backing_somali_war_criminal (describing the surprising makeup of parties that submitted ami-
cus briefs in Samantar). 
43 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 7, Saman-
tar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No 08–1555), 2010 WL 342031 at *6. 
44 See Brief of Amici Curiae Martin Weiss et al. in Support of Respondents at 1, Saman-
tar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08–1555), 2010 WL 342040, at *5–6. 
45 See id. 
46 See Brief for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner at 3, Sa-
mantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08–1555), 2009 WL 4693842, at *4; Amicus Curiae Brief of the 
American Jewish Congress in Support of Petitioner at 3, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08–
1555), 2009 WL 4709540, at *4. 
47 See Brief for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner at 3, Sa-
mantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08–1555); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Jewish Con-
gress in Support of Petitioner at 3, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08–1555). 
48 See Victor, supra note 42. 
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the legislative intent in determining the extent of immunity provided 
by the Act.49 The Court noted that the FSIA was intended to embody 
the “restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity, which did not provide 
immunity to foreign governments in suits that were strictly commercial 
in nature.50 As a result, the language of the FSIA is also distinctly com-
mercial in its terminology.51 While the FSIA applies immunity to “any 
agency or instrumentality” of a foreign government, because Congress 
chose to employ corporate terminology, using words such as “entity” 
and “separate legal person,” the Court viewed such language as restrict-
ing the immunity to only government entities rather than individuals.52 
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained that there was no 
Congressional intent to apply FSIA to individuals with its enactment.53 
Because the stated purpose of the FSIA was to codify immunity in a 
modern world where foreign states act as everyday market participants, 
the Supreme Court was unwilling to apply the Chuidian interpretation 
that also extends immunity to individual officials.54 
 The Court also stated that the Ninth Circuit’s fears of “artful plead-
ing[s]” —creating an avenue around the immunity principles the FSIA 
aimed to enforce—were unfounded.55 While the FSIA does not ex-
pressly bar suits against foreign officials, the Court noted that the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as common law principles of im-
munity, remain in place to dismiss many such actions.56 Because a state 
would likely be a necessary party in a suit against a foreign officer for 
his or her official actions, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) would 
require dismissal if FSIA immunity rendered that state party unavail-
able.57 Similarly, even if a state is not a required party, common law 
immunity may still be available to government officials regardless of the 
application of the FSIA.58 While the Supreme Court remanded the case 
to the district court for determination of the availability of common law 
immunity to Samantar, it refused to address the question in its opin-
                                                                                                                      
49 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292. 
50 Id. at 2285. 
51 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (using corporate language such as “separate legal person” to 
define an “agency and instrumentality of a foreign state”); see also Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2286. 
52 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2287 (stating that even if the list in § 1603 is merely illus-
trative, a “foreign state” cannot include its officials, because the types of defendants listed 
are all entities). 
53 Id. at 2289. 
54 See id. at 2291. 
55 Id. at 2292. 
56 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(1)(b); Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292. 
57 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2292. 
58 See id. 
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ion.59 The Court did, however, make mention of the historic, common 
law role of the government in suggesting immunity for foreign offi-
cials.60 Finally, the Court also noted that the challenge of gaining per-
sonal jurisdiction over a foreign official still poses a significant barrier 
to such suits, even if FSIA immunity does not apply.61 
III. Analysis 
 In Samantar, the Supreme Court unanimously held that govern-
ment officials do not qualify for sovereign immunity as “foreign state[s]” 
under the FSIA.62 The Court did, however, acknowledge the potential 
availability of common law sovereign immunity to foreign officials.63 
While Samantar helped to clarify the scope of the FSIA, the common law 
offers considerable immunity to foreign officials, either for acts per-
formed in an “official capacity” or upon a recommendation by the State 
Department.64 Because these avenues of immunity remain available, the 
Samantar holding simply represents a narrowed interpretation of the 
FSIA, rather than a meaningful change in the law that will help bring 
human rights abusers to justice.65 
 While the Supreme Court declined to address the issue in Samantar, 
recent circuit court opinions indicate that the common law immunity 
available to foreign officials is extensive.66 In a recent case, Abi Jaoudi & 
Azar Trading Corp. v. Cigna Worldwide Insurance Co., the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals followed Samantar and remanded the case for a de-
termination of any common law immunity available to the Insurance 
Commissioner of Liberia from a contempt finding against him.67 In its 
opinion, the Third Circuit referenced Samantar’s language that there 
may be a possible connection “between the FSIA analysis in [those cir-
cuit courts that granted FSIA immunity to foreign officials] and the 
                                                                                                                      
59 See id. at 2290 n.15. 
60 See id. at 2290 (describing the historic practice of the government suggesting immu-
nity for individuals, even when the foreign state did not qualify). 
61 See id. at 2292–93. 
62 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2286 (2010). 
63 See id. at 2293. 
64 See id. at 2290–91 (stating that in some circumstances the immunity of the foreign 
state extends to official capacity actions); see also Jennifer Elsea, Cong. Research Serv., 
R41379, Samantar v. Yousef: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Foreign 
Officials 12 (2010) (stating that Samantar likely allows for the Executive Branch to dictate 
immunity in foreign relations matters). 
65 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292 (emphasizing the narrowness of the holding). 
66 See Abi Jaoudi & Azar Trading Corp. v. Cigna Worldwide Ins. Co., Nos. 09–1297, 09–
1298, 2010 WL 3279173, at *5 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2010). 
67 See id. at *1. 
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common law immunity inquiry.”68 The FSIA analysis the court refers to 
involves the application of FSIA immunity to instances where a foreign 
official acts within his or her “official capacity.”69 Under this analysis, the 
district courts were so protective of sovereign immunity that they even 
included official acts committed in violation of jus cogens70—principles 
of international law, such as torture and extra-judicial killings.71 There-
fore, should this official capacity test have any bearing on common law 
immunity determinations, as the Third Circuit suggests, it is unlikely 
that foreign officials will more readily face liability for their official ac-
tions, including human rights abuses.72 This is especially true given the 
extra immunity protection the common law affords to a foreign state’s 
military actions.73 
 There is a great deal of both domestic and international support 
for the contention that common law immunity extends to a foreign of-
ficer’s official acts. The American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) 
of Foreign Relations Law in the United States § 66 states that “immu-
nity of a foreign state . . . extends to . . . any other public minister, offi-
cial or agent of the state with respect to acts performed in his official 
capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a 
rule of law against the state.”74 Should the district courts apply the view 
of the Restatement in their common law inquiry, foreign officials will 
likely remain immune from suits regarding actions taken by them in 
their governmental capacity.75 While the Supreme Court declined to 
consider the authority of the Restatement on this issue, such authority 
may factor into common law immunity considerations.76 
 The 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immuni-
ties of States and Their Property also indicates that international com-
                                                                                                                      
68 Id. at *5 n.5. 
69 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291 n.17. 
70 Black’s Law Dictionary defines jus cogens as “[a] mandatory or peremptory norm of 
general international law accepted and recognized by the international community as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted.” Black’s Law Dictionary 937 (9th ed. 
2009). 
71 See Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity 336 (2d ed. 2008). 
72 See id. 
73 See Victory Transp. v. Comisaria Gen., 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964) (describing 
“acts concerning the armed forces” as a category of activity generally requiring sovereign 
immunity). 
74 See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 66 (1962). 
75 See id. 
76 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2290. 
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mon law extends immunity to an individual’s official acts.77 The Con-
vention, which, like the FSIA, codifies the “restrictive theory” of immu-
nity, specifically defines a “State” as including “representatives of the 
State acting in that capacity.”78 In this regard, the Convention reflects 
classic international sovereign immunity principles, imputing any act of 
a foreign official as an act of the state “who alone is responsible for its 
consequence.”79 While the Convention is not yet in force, and U.S. 
courts are not obligated to follow it, it nonetheless indicates consider-
able international consensus that sovereign immunity extends to offi-
cial capacity actions.80 It does remain unclear, however, whether viola-
tions of controversial jus cogens principles of international law, such as 
torture and extrajudicial killings, will override immunity considera-
tions.81 Recent decisions indicate that in civil proceedings for such 
crimes, requiring the exhaustion of local remedies remains the pre-
ferred means of disposal, which could leave many of these cases outside 
of U.S. courts.82 Therefore, given the prominence of official capacity 
immunity in both U.S. and international law, it seems that Samantar will 
do little to make justice more accessible to victims of acts committed by 
foreign officials within the scope of their government duties.83 
 Even if the district courts do not find sovereign immunity under 
an official capacity application, the traditional role of the State De-
partment in making immunity recommendations still limits the signifi-
cance of the Samantar holding.84 Although the FSIA was intended to 
shift state immunity determinations away from the Executive, the 
common law still provides for input from the Executive Branch in de-
termining immunity of individuals.85 Therefore, under Samantar, dip-
lomatic and strategic concerns will still play a role in the application of 
                                                                                                                      
77 See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property part I art. 2, Dec. 2, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 803 (requiring that a representative of a state 
acting in his or her official capacity be incorporated into the definition of a state). 
78 Id. 
79 See Fox, supra note 71, at 455. 
80 See id. at 35 (stating that the U.N. convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and their Property codifies the restrictive theory of immunity in international law, provid-
ing immunity for official public actions). 
81 See id. at 156. 
82 See id. 
83 See Elsea, supra note 64, at 11; Fox, supra note 71, at 156. 
84 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291 n.19. 
85 See Elsea, supra note 64, at 12 (stating that under common law the courts should de-
fer to the Executive Branch’s immunity recommendations because of foreign relations 
implications); see also Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292 (stating that the FSIA was never intended 
to supersede the common law of foreign official immunity). 
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immunity to individual foreign agents.86 While the State Department 
declined to intervene in the case of Mohamed Ali Samantar, an aging 
relic of failed U.S. foreign policy, the courts are still likely to defer to 
any Executive requests for immunity.87 
 In Belhas v. Ya’alon, the D.C. District Court applied FSIA immunity 
to a suit against Moshe Ya’alon, the former head of Israeli Army Intelli-
gence, for war crimes against Lebanese civilians in the 1996 shelling of 
Qana.88 While Samantar would have rendered FSIA immunity unavail-
able to Ya’alon individually, Israel’s status as a close military ally would 
have likely encouraged the Executive Branch to intervene and ensure 
Ya’alon’s immunity under its common law role.89 In order for Samantar 
to require that a human rights abuser be held accountable in U.S. 
courts, the Executive Branch must also deem that individual unworthy 
of diplomatic intervention.90 Because human rights abuses often occur 
in countries closely allied with the United States, any foreign officials 
sued for such abuses are more likely to be granted immunity by the 
State Department.91 While Samantar may be of little concern to the 
State Department, the Executive Branch has recently demonstrated 
that it is willing to intervene in suits against diplomatically important 
individuals, such as members of the Saudi royal family.92 While Saman-
tar does strip individual human rights abusers of FSIA immunity, be-
cause the Executive Branch still possesses the power to make immunity 
recommendations under the common law, it seems unlikely that Sa-
                                                                                                                      
86 See Bellinger, supra note 11, at 47. 
87 See Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 
2007), rev’d, 532 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2009); Elsea, supra note 
64, at 12; Bellinger, supra note 11, at 47. 
88 See Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1281, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
89 See Bellinger, supra note 11, at 47(describing other presidential requests for immu-
nity, such as for Israeli intelligence chief Avi Dichter for alleged war crimes). 
90 See Elsea, supra note 64, at 12 (describing the deference owed to the Executive 
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mantar will profoundly increase the accountability of human rights ab-
users in U.S. courts.93 
Conclusion 
 In Samantar, the Supreme Court sought to correct conflicting me-
thods of application of a federal immunity statute. In doing so, the 
Court defined the appropriate scope of the FSIA and ensured a more 
consistent application of the sovereign immunity doctrine in the dis-
trict courts. However, while the FSIA may no longer offer immunity to 
foreign officials individually, the Samantar ruling will do little to lessen 
the challenge of bringing justice to the victims of human rights abuses 
in U.S. courts. Samantar is hardly effective in ensuring that human 
rights abusers can no longer escape liability for their reprehensible ac-
tions, due to the avenues of common law immunity still available to for-
eign officials. Rather, Samantar simply clarified the means that would-be 
defendants must use to continue to escape liability. In instances where 
the officials responsible committed abuses within their official capacity 
and remain diplomatically important to U.S. interests, the prospects of 
justice for victims of such abuse remain as illusory as they were under 
the previous application of FSIA immunity. 
                                                                                                                      
93 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292; Elsea, supra note 64, at 11; Bellinger, supra note 11, 
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